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25X6
Policies---Comments of Estimates Group

being told LLEGIB

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very little he either doesn't know or could not

infer about policy. Perhaps this is inevitable, the having

no iron curtain; yet, as usual, the Top Secret label necessarily leaders to

- 2. Summary. Seemed to E.G. that model of ORE 1 had been carried too far. In ORE 1
 The 1,2.3. order there had been used to fit a special case where main specific considerations were enumerated. In ORE 26, the process becomes practically a numbering of ensuing paragraphs, represented in the summary by one or two sentences from each. Result is the summary becames too long and too diffuse. Would suggest compressing in style of more recent ORE's.
- 3. p.4(bottom) to p.5 (top). Toom much in oneparagraph, loosely held together by 25X6 general idea of the Needs to be broken up into component parts.

When you mention investments in Africa, etc., aren't a lot of people going to think right off about military plans for the area which have been so well publicized? Wouldn't they expect full discussion about plans

and progress of plans for making this area substitute for either here or in part 2?
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4. p.6. Believe this might be halved. Far as one can see, all it says is that they're tied to our tail; know it, and will remain tied until they can shake loose.

5/. p.7. "Moreover, the .etc." Considering that there are still those who think in terms of suggest the inference might be taken here, little as you intended it, that under tempting enough circumstances the might desert us. If this is true, it should be stated clearly and without qualification. If it is inconceivable (as implied previously in paper) no hints should be left that would arouse easily_aroused ses suspicions. 6. Same page. A similar _con usion might be engendered by the discussion of Satellites. Here there might seem to be some most un-characteristic wishful believe that they care thinking in How can the simultaneously adopt a line parallel to ours toward the Soviet complex --- which is some-

thing little short of overt warfare---while cultivating nice friendly trade relations

Of this too much of a with-us-or-against-us fight for that?

25X6

7. pp.10-12. Discussion of the Near East seemed to E.G. definitely inconclusive.

Case could be made that this is the most important area discussed; yet there are
a lot of unanswered questions. For example, in the struggle to keep the Soviets

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their own oil interests were too deeply imperiled, or that they would exchange concessions with the Russians if they thought it wise. In short, if it became a choice of which to lose---the US or Abadan---which would go? Greece, Turkey, and Iran get only the most cursory mention; yet US interests there are considerable at present and the views of toward them correspondingly important. Believe 25X1A the people in could help a lot to expand this.

8. Military Section. Seemed fine in general.

ILLEGIB

Have feeling there is one thing

Impression gained that 25X6

Impression gained that is among those who expect a push-button war and know that in any case, they can't compete in sheer manpower and material field; have hence great emphasis on seignment science and secret weapons. If any truth in any of this, shouldn't there be full discussion of what is happening on 25X6

research and the rest of it?

9. Has paper been fully coordinated in ORE. If not, just about every branch skex could probably contribute something valuable.